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JR55, Judicial Strategy and the Limits of Textual Reasoning 
Richard Kirkham 
A. Introduction 
The question of how the courts should exert control over the exercise of discretionary power 
is an important one, particularly when that discretion is statutorily provided for in wide terms. 
In such cases the judge is obliged to navigate uncertain boundaries between constitutional 
restraint and what might be thought of as inappropriate activism.1 This article explores the 
limits of some of the judicial strategies that can be deployed in managing this exercise, using 
the Supreme Court judgment in JR552 as the backdrop.  
JR55 is an interesting case with which to consider the adjudication of discretionary power 
because it does not include any reference to human rights or EU law, a focus on which has on 
occasion come close to drowning out more practical considerations as to the strategies upon 
which judges base their decision-making. One of the key concerns regarding statutory 
interpretation has extra-judicially been well described by Lord Sumption, who coincidentally 
gave the sole judgment in JR55. 
If judges go beyond the text and resort to some more general scheme of values, they must 
necessarily do so either in accordance with their own personal preferences or else in accordance 
with what they think that the lawgiver would have done if he had addressed other problems 
which for whatever reason he left alone.3 
To avoid the consequent risks of judicial overreach when interpreting legislation, it is 
sometimes argued that strict textual techniques, as opposed to purposive or contextual 
techniques, are preferable strategies for judges to rely on.4 In JR55 a text-based strategy was 
applied to give meaning to a very broad discretionary power but, critiquing this approach, this 
article demonstrates that it is not always appropriate. Further, it is argued that there should be 
an onus on the judge to be transparent about the reasons for the choice of interpretative 
technique adopted. The importance of justifying decision-making strategies was very evident 
in JR55 because, given the nature of the underlying legal problem being addressed, the 
textual strategies adopted were incapable of providing a transparent tool for judicial decision-
making. The outcome is a badly reasoned decision based, ironically, on unspecified policy 
choices, which has created uncertainty in the law.  
A claim of this article is that the context of a dispute should drive the strategy chosen for 
considering administrative discretion. In JR55, because of the nature of the ombudsman 
function under review, the circumstances required of the Court a deferential approach, one 
which was more willing to accept the scale of the discretion conferred by Parliament and 
instead more focussed on testing the manner in which that power had been exercised. The 
proposed approach would not necessarily have changed the decision in JR55 but, if applied, 
would have shown more respect for institutional boundaries, been more transparent and 
                                                 

 I would like to thank Paul Cardwell, Graham Gee, Edward Kirton-Darling, Lindsay Stirton, Brian Thompson, 
Joseph Tomlinson and Dimitrios Tsarapatsanis for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. The usual 
disclaimers apply. 
1
 /RUG,UYLQH³Activism and Restraint: Human Rights DQGWKH,QWHUSUHWDWLYH3URFHVV´ (1999) 10 K.C.L.J. 177; 
/RUG6XPSWLRQ³-XGLFLDODQG3ROLWLFDODecision-0DNLQJ´>@-5 301. 
2
 In the matter of an application by JR55 for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2016] UKSC 22 
3
 /RUG6XPSWLRQ³$5HVSRQVH´LQN. Barber, R. Ekins and P. Yowell (eds), Lord Sumption and the Limits of 
the Law. (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2016), p. 215. 
4
 /RUG6XPSWLRQ³7KH/LPLWVRI/DZ´ in N. Barber, R. Ekins and P. Yowell (eds), Lord Sumption and the 
Limits of the Law. Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2016. 
 2 
 
reduced the collateral impact of the case by allowing for a more coherent and manageable 
adaptation of the law. 
  
B. JR55, comity and the ombudsman sector 
JR55 involved a complaint that had been made against a medical general practitioner (GP) by 
the widow of one of his patients. The Commissioner possessed extensive powers to 
investigate the complaint, attempt a settlement and make recommendations as to the remedy. 
The Commissioner found that there had been service failure and maladministration on the 
part of the GP in his care of the FRPSODLQDQW¶V KXVEDQG )ROORZLQJ WKH &RPPLVVLRQHU¶V
report, the GP acknowledged this and apologised but disputed the Commissioner¶V
recommendation that he pay £10k compensation. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled the 
recommendation as irrational and by implication outside of his statutory powers and also 
ruled unlawful the accompanying suggestion that the Commissioner may consider issuing a 
special report to the Northern Ireland Assembly on the matter.  
To understand the problems JR55 gives rise to it is necessary to consider the background 
history of the ombudsman sector which raises issues of constitutional comity. Comity is the 
idea that different institutional branches of the constitution should show respect for the roles 
and legitimacy of other branches of the constitution.5 Ordinarily, the concept is raised in 
UHODWLRQWRWKHFRXUW¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHH[HFXWLYHDQG3DUOLDPHQW6 However, bodies such 
as the Commissioner for Complaints which was challenged in JR55 hover in a fluid zone 
across all three branches and are rarely captured coherently in constitutional theory.7 
In the UK there are at least 16 statutory schemes8 and many other additional non-statutory 
schemes.9 Albeit that there are differences in the operation of different schemes, a common 
feature is that ombudsman schemes independently process the grievances of citizens that in 
the main would otherwise remain unattended to, except on the few occasions when access to 
the courts might be viable. In this area the court-based remedies that may be available are 
often only a hypothetical option to the citizen. The practice of the sector has received regular 
scrutiny by legislatures and over time the powers and jurisdiction of schemes have tended to 
be expanded rather than retracted.10 One might even argue that the sector has been 
                                                 
5
 T. Endicott, Administrative Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2015), p. 20. 
6
 A. Horne, G. Drewry and D. Oliver (eds), Parliament and the Law. (London: Hart Publishing, 2013). 
7
 & *LOO ³The evolving role of the ombudsman: a conceptual and FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DQDO\VLV RI WKH µ6FRWWLVK
VROXWLRQ¶ WRDGPLQLVWUDWLYHMXVWLFH¶´ [2014] P.L. 662. 
8
 The Parliamentary Ombudsman (Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967); Local Government Ombudsman 
(Local Government Act 1974, as amended); Health Services Ombudsman (Health Service Commissioners Act 
1993); Pensions Ombudsman (Pension Schemes Act 1993); Housing Ombudsman (Housing Act 1996, section 
51 of and Schedule 2); Police Ombudsman Northern Ireland (Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, 200, 2003): 
Financial Ombudsman Service (Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (as amended); Scottish Public 
Services Ombudsman (Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 2002); Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (Police Reform Act 2002); Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education (Higher 
Education Act 2004); Public Services Ombudsman for Wales (Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005); 
Police Investigations and Review Commissioner (Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 
2006, Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012); Scottish Legal Complaints Commission (Legal Profession 
and Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 2007); Legal Ombudsman (Legal Services Act 2007); Service Complaints 
Ombudsman (Armed Forces Service Complaints and Financial Assistance Act 2015); Public Services 
Ombudsman Act (Northern Ireland) 2016.   
9
 For more details see the Ombudsman Association website: http://www.ombudsmanassociation.org/find-an-
ombudsman.php 
10
 Eg Local Government and Public Involvement Act 2007, Part 9; Public Services Reform (Scotland) Act 2010, 
Section 16. 
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constructed and allowed to evolve ZLWKWKHOHJLVODWXUH¶VDFTXLHVFHQFHprecisely because the 
democratic branch of the state has concluded that the judicial method is structurally incapable 
of delivering mass administrative justice.  
By coincidence, with the Commissioner for Complaints scheme, this apparent faith had been 
reemphasised just a couple of months previous to JR55 being decided. The Public Services 
Ombudsman Act (Northern Ireland) 2016 established a new integrated ombudsman scheme 
in Northern Ireland, including the replacement of the work of the Commissioner. Under the 
Act it is specified that the new Ombudsman does possess the powers that were disputed in 
JR55, in particular the power to make financial recommendations11 and to issue special 
reports in the event of a GP refusing to comply with recommendations.12  
The growing status of the ombudsman sector is also reflected in existing case law,13 in which 
the courts have regularly recognised that an ombudsman operates with considerable 
discretion.14 This legislative design has been taken to imply that, in order to retain loyalty to 
legislative intention, the court should not generally attempt to establish sophisticated 
constructions to an ombudsPDQ¶VGLVFUHWLRQDU\SRZHUV7KHXQGHUSLQQLQJ UDWLRQDOH IRU WKLV
strategy is that the µ&RXUW¶V VXSHUYLVRU\ MXULVGLFWLRQ VKRXOGEH H[HUFLVHG ZLWK VHQVLWLYLW\ WR
WKHVSHFLDOQDWXUHRI WKH«2PEXGVPDQ
VFRQVWLWXWLRQDO UROHDQG IXQFWLRQ¶15 as well as its 
expertise. This UHDGLQJRIWKHFRXUW¶VUROHLVUHSHDWHGLQPXOWLSOHFDVHVZLWKWKHDLPWRDYRLG
XQGHUPLQLQJWKHRPEXGVPDQ¶V capacity to operate effectively.16 This evolving constitutional 
relationship suggests that any interpretative endeavour on the part of the court to place 
UHVWULFWLRQVRQDQRPEXGVPDQ¶VSRZHU should at the very least be supported by a sustained 
effort to establish good reasons for undertaking the exercise, such as if a particular statutory 
provision contains sufficient detail to justify an interpretation on the text alone.17  
Reflecting this position, iQ FRXUW WKH RPEXGVPDQ¶V H[HUFLVH RI SRZHUV KDV WHQGHG WR EH
controlled through standard public law grounds - such as fairness in process, consideration of 
relevant factors and rational decision-making ± not statutory interpretation.18 7KLVµGRFWULQDO¶
approach can be understood as compatible with the legislative will because the implications 
of individual decisions are incremental, often case specific and much less likely to undermine 
the discretionary power of the ombudsman than placing lasting restrictions on that power 
through textual interpretation. Notably, even in the application of doctrinal grounds there is a 
clear reluctance in the case law to find fault too readily in ombudsman schemes, and where 
this option is taken the emphasis has been on backing up rulings with robust evidence and 
providing legal guidance for the future.19  
This pre-JR55 settlement in the jurisprudence on ombudsman schemes might be argued to be 
too deferential towards the ombudsman sector and not allow for sufficient scrutiny of 
                                                 
11
 S.11(b)(ii),  
12
 See s.16(3) and s.46(2). 
13
 R. v Commissioner for Local Administration Ex p. Croydon LBC [1989] 1 All E.R. 1033; Cavanagh v Health 
Service Commissioner [2005] EWCA Civ 1578. 
14
 R. Kirkham DQG$$OOW³0DNLQJ6HQVHRIWKH&DVH/DZRQWKH2PEXGVPDQ´>2016] JSWFL 211. 
15
 Argyll & Bute Council v SPSO [2007] CSOH 168, at [16], per Lord Machphail. 
16
 Eg R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex p Dyer [1994] 1 WLR 621, pp. 626E-G, per 
Simon-Brown LJ; Siborurma, at [60]; Walker, Re Judicial Review [2013] NIQB 12, at [11]; R (Crawford) v The 
Legal Ombudsman & Anor [2014] EWHC 182; Muldoon v IPCC [2009] EWHC 3633, at [19]. 
17
 R (Bluefin Insurance Services Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2014] EWHC 3413. 
18
 Eg Balchin v Parliamentary Commissioner For Administration [1996] EWHC Admin 152; R (Turpin) v 
Commissioner for Local Administration [2002] JPL 326; R (Cardao-Pito) v Office of the Independent 
Adjudicator for Higher Education [2012] EWHC 203.   
19
 F. Mitchell, The OIA and Judicial Review: Ten principles from ten years of challenges. (Office of the 
Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education: Reading, 2015). 
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ombudsman determinations, but this is a separate debate. As an overarching strategy towards 
managing the relationship between the courts and the ombudsman, as well as securing 
judicial restraint and developing legal certainty, this approach has largely been successful. 
Without explanation, in JR55 a very different strategy was adopted which potentially signals 
a more interventionist attitude of the courts towards ombudsman schemes. 
 
C. The risks of moving beyond literal interpretation 
When discretionary power has been statutorily conferred, a judge is faced with a number of 
choices as to how to interpret that power, which places a heavy emphasis on how the judge 
manages his/her interpretative role. The idea that a judge has choices to make in decision-
making implies that there is an inherent indeterminacy in the law when it comes to difficult 
cases such as JR55,20 a claim regularly made over the years by what might be labelled old 
and new legal realist critiques of judicial decision-making.21 At least in hard cases, the judge 
will often have conflicting case law to make use of and a choice of legal rules to apply which 
provides them with sufficient opportunity to disguise underlying preferences within their 
decision-making.22 Such indeterminacy in judicial decision-making creates the space for 
debate about the appropriate levels of judicial activism/restraint, or the degree and form in 
which judicial power should be exercised.23 
In response to these problems of indeterminacy, various judicial strategies have been 
advocated to help channel the choices made by judges in selecting when and how to apply 
legal doctrine and principle.24 With regard to statutory interpretation, broadly three separate 
strategies are available to manage the challenge: literal, textual and contextual interpretation. 
These three strategies can be illustrated through the judgment in JR55.  
Literal interpretation 
The most obvious strategy a judge can adopt in statutory interpretation is to focus only on 
identifying the natural and ordinary meaning to be given to the measure being interpreted: 
typically referred to as literal interpretation.25 This strategy limits the judicial role when a 
legislator confers on an administrative body broad power through ambiguous language.  
In JR55 the relevant provision was article 11 of the Commissioner for Complaints (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1996 which enabled the Commissioner to investigate a complaint and: 
(b) where it appears to the Commissioner to be desirable -  
(i) to effect a settlement of the matter complained of; or  
(ii) if that is not possible, to state what action should in his opinion be taken by the body 
concerned, the general health care provider concerned or the independent provider concerned « 
to effect a fair settlement of that matter «. 
Read literally article 11 leaves FRQVLGHUDEOH SRZHU LQ WKH KDQGV RI WKH &RPPLVVLRQHU µWR
HIIHFW D VHWWOHPHQW¶ with no limitations clarified specifically in the Order albeit that it is 
noticeable that KH LV QRW JLYHQ WKH SRZHU WR HQIRUFH KLV SURSRVHG µIDLU VHWWOHPHQW¶ LQ WKH
                                                 
20
 B. Leiter, ³Legal ,QGHWHUPLQDF\´ (1995) Legal Theory 481. 
21
 91RXUVHDQG*6KDIIHU³Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal 
7KHRU\´ (2009-2010) 95 Cornell Law Review 61. 
22
 -&RQDJKDQ³&HOHEUDWLQJ'XQFDQ.HQQHG\
V6FKRODUVKLS$µ&ULW¶$QDO\VLVRI'6'	1%9Y&RPPLVVLRQHU
RI3ROLFHIRUWKH0HWURSROLV´7UDQVQDWLRQDO/HJDO7KHRU\-621. 
23
 Eg The Judicial Power Project, available at: http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/ 
24
 -.LQJ³Institutional ASSURDFKHVWR-XGLFLDO5HVWUDLQW´ (2008) 28 OJLS 409-441. 
25
 (%HOO³Judicial perspectiYHVRQVWDWXWRU\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´ (2013) 39 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 245, 252-
54.   
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courts. The judgment in JR55, however, did not adopt a literal interpretation strategy and 
instead sought to explain, through different techniques, how the discretionary power was 
limited in law.  
There is plenty of precedent for the courts being unwilling to allow the statutory scope of 
discretionary power to go uninterrogated26 and the sensitive nature of the facts of JR55 
illustrate why deeper judicial scrutiny might be justified. The grievance of the complainant 
could hardly be more serious than in JR55EXWWKHFDUHHULPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V
investigation on the GP involved were also such that heightened attention to fair play was 
deserved. In adjudicating the matter, like all ombudsman schemes, high standards of fairness 
were expected of the Commissioner, albeit these standards were not detailed in legislation. 
But the Commissioner operates autonomously and without the backdrop of democratic 
accountability to scruWLQLVH WKH RIILFH¶V LQGLYLGXDO decisions. In this context, and given the 
FRXUW¶V LQKHUHQW LQWHUHVW DQG H[SHUWLVH LQ DGMXGLFDWLQJ RQ MXVWLFH DQG individual rights, it is 
unsurprising that the court should claim an institutional duty to review the decisions of the 
Commissioner.27 Nevertheless, attempting to constrain administrative discretion through 
narrow interpretations of the legislative will is a problematic enterprise.  
The importance of selecting interpretation strategies according to context 
When a judge chooses an interpretative strategy that goes beyond a literal interpretation, there 
are risks involved. By choosing not to follow the most obvious interpretation - which in JR55 
would have entailed accepting that the Commissioner has wide discretion - a court creates 
uncertainty in the future application of the law. This follows because judicial interventions 
will be sporadic and focus only on discrete aspects of the discretionary power conferred, 
leaving only limited case law for future users of the law to understand what the limits on the 
discretionary power may include. This room for uncertainty will likely add costs to the 
decision-making process in the office of the primary decision-maker and encourage litigation.  
More significantly, in giving itself the task of resolving ambiguities in legislation, the court is 
obliged to make choices as to how the legislation should be read,28 a task which might be 
EHWWHUXQGHUVWRRGDVDQH[HUFLVHLQµFRQVWUXFWLQJ¶WKHOHJLVODWLRQUDWKHUWKDQµLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶29 
These choices go both to the individual decision being considered in the case and the manner 
in which the legislative power being interpreted will be applied in the future.30 The 
introduction of these choices leaves the Court vulnerable to the accusation that it is acting 
contrary to the legislative will or is overreaching its powers. Hence, before going beyond the 
literal approach to interpretation, it is appropriate for it to reflect upon and be transparent 
about the reasons why a more expansive interpretative strategy is required. Such an 
explanation should include consideration of the level of institutional competence it has to 
take on the challenge31 and an explanation of why one interpretive approach is more 
appropriate than any other. By itself such a duty of candour would encourage self-restraint.32 
                                                 
26
 Eg Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997, at p.1030 per Lord Reid 
27
 Eg R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Ex Parte Dyer [1994] 1 WLR 621. The need for 
judicial review of ombudsman schemes has been disputed, but this argument will not be addressed here, see 
Endicott, Administrative Law, x.  
28
 %HOO³Judicial perspectiYHVRQVWDWXWRU\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´ (2013) 39 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 245, 252-54. 
29
 7 (QGLFRWW ³/HJDO ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ´ In A. Marmor (ed), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law 
(London: Routledge, 2012). 
30
 $$VKZRUWK³,QWHUSUHWLQJ&ULPLQDO6WDWXWHVD &ULVLVRI/HJDOLW\´>@L.Q.R. 419, 445. 
31
 C. Sunstein and A. Vermeule, ³Institutions DQG,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ´Michigan Law Review 885. 
32
 B. HarriV ³The continuing struggle with the nuanced obligation on judges to provide reasons for their 
GHFLVLRQV´ [2016] 132 LQR 216, 222. 
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5RVHQ KDV UHFHQWO\ DUJXHG µthat different approaches to statutory interpretation might be 
appropriate for dealing with different exercises of legislative power.¶33 If correct, this implies 
that it is incumbent on the courts to take into account the different expectations that lie behind 
legislation. A feature of the judgment in JR55, however, was that no consideration of this 
issue, or explanation of the judicial strategy adopted, was provided.  
 
D. Textual interpretation and the Commissioner for Complaints Order 1996 
Possible benefits of textual interpretation 
Beyond a literal interpretation of legislation, a judge can choose between textual and 
contextual strategies.34 Most of the effort throughout the judgment in JR55 was focused on a 
textual interpretation strategy, a phrase used here to describe a judicial endeavour to construct 
meaning to a legislative provision from the text alone and without consideration of context. 
At only one point were comparisons drawn from other ombudsman schemes.35 Minimal 
energy, if any, was invested in factoring into the interpretation the context in which the 
Commissioner scheme operated or the purposes for which it was created. This approach also 
meant that the Court paid very little attention to judicial precedent, citing only two cases.36  
Evidence that the Court was attracted to an interpretation strategy based on the text alone can 
be seen in WKH MXGJPHQW¶V neat rebuttal to any claim that the ombudsman sector exists as a 
discrete and important branch of the administrative justice system, operating in part 
according to its own growing body of operational and legal norms.37  
The various [ombudsman] enactments have a strong family resemblance. But some of 
them have distinctive features which mean that considerable caution is required 
before principles derived from one legislative scheme can be read across to another.38  
Textual interpretation strategies might appear the most appropriate approach towards 
understanding administrative discretion because they require the judge to focus only on the 
legislation in hand. Through such a strategy, the democratic will may be claimed to dominate 
and not the policy preferences of the judiciary,39 with any subsequent need for judges to reach 
out to judge-made (and non-legislative) legal doctrine thereby narrowed. Indeed, any use of 
judicial precedent needs some justification if the legislation is adequate to provide the 
answers. Likewise the textual approach encourages the judge to avoid considering the 
morality of the decision. If this approach leads to difficult outcomes the solution is for the 
legislature to revise the law. The legislature possesses a more appropriate set of competences 
to amend the law, as opposed to the court which has neither democratic legitimacy nor the 
procedural or resource capacity to factor in the requisite body of polycentric matters needed 
to devise new policy-loaded solutions. This leads to another purported strength of the textual 
approach, it reduces the potential for a judge to create new unforeseen problems through 
misconceived contextually based interpretations.       
These claims in favour of textual interpretation should be taken seriously, but it will be 
argued here that in the context of JR55 the limitations in this strategy were demonstrated.  
                                                 
33
 $5RVHQ³Statutory Interpretation and the Many Virtues of Legislation´ [2016] OJLS (forthcoming).  
34
 Eg. : (VNULGJH ³Dynamic Statutory Interpretation´ (1987) U. PA. L. REV. 1479; John F. Manning, 
³TextualisPDQGWKH(TXLW\RIWKH6WDWXWH´ (2001) Columbia Law Review 36. 
35
 JR55, [26]-[27].  
36
 Croydon and R (Bradley) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] ECWA Civ 36. 
37
 R. Kirkham DQG$$OOW³0DNLQJ6HQVHRIWKH&DVH/DZRQWKH2PEXGVPDQ´>2016] JSWFL 211. 
38
 JR55, [1]. 
39
 John F. Manning, ³TextualisPDQGWKH(TXLW\RIWKH6WDWXWH´, (2001) 101 Columbia Law Review 36. 
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Textual interpretation is not always constrained or neutral 
It is disingenuous to claim that the interpretation of a discretionary power is ever completely 
neutral or entirely focused on the legislative will. Beyond literal interpretations, choices are 
always being made when a statute is being interpreted and those choices will inevitably have 
policy implications. The simplest example in JR55 to illustrate this point is the finding on the 
quality of the settlement process that the Commissioner applied, as allowed for in article 11. 
The judgment ILQGV LQ RQH VHQWHQFH WKDW WKH µ&RPPLVVLRQHU QHYHU VRXJKW WR RSHUDWH WKH 
VHWWOHPHQWSURFHGXUH¶40 But to assess the legality of WKH&RPPLVVLRQHU¶VXVHRIWKHVHWWOHPHQW
process, we require (i) some understanding of what a lawful settlement procedure looks like; 
DQGLLVRPHHYLGHQFHWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQHU¶VSURFHVVHVGLGQRWPDWFKWKDWXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
On paper at least, the judgment provides answers to neither issue.  
Lack of clarity in judicial reasoning is not an attribute isolated to textual interpretations, but 
this example demonstrates the conceptual difficulties faced with this judicial strategy. The 
problem here is that article 11 does not tell us what the features of the settlement process are, 
how it should operate or what its outputs might look like. The only way that such meaning 
could be constructed without adding extra-legal input is if there is another legal source 
available that provides us with clues as to the answer, yet none is provided in JR55. Maybe 
the Court had a clear conception of what an appropriate settlement procedure might look like 
and by oversight only did not inform us. But even if the Supreme Court had provided an 
explanation that provided the foundations of a model settlement process, this extra-legislative 
input would require interrogation. Indeed, once it is concluded that the statutory discretion of 
the Commissioner is not to be taken at literal value, it is hard to see how a judicial 
interpretation of the settlement process provided for in legislation could be anything other 
than a decision based on judicial pre-conceptions to be found external to the legislation. 
Reading around the legislation does not necessarily prevent the intrusion of policy  
The best reading of JR55 is that it attempts to derive clarity as to the scope of the 
&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V SRZHU WKURXJK DQ DQDO\VLV RI D UDQJH RI GLIIHUHQW SURYLVLRQV in the 1996 
Order. This is a classic technique in statutory interpretation whereby the judge moves beyond 
the individual provision being interpreted and look to the four corners41 of the legislation in 
question in order to get an improved sense of both its purpose and interlocking functionality. 
The relevant provisions included:42  
x Article 7 ± the receipt of complaints against public bodies. 
x Article 8 ± the receipt of complaints against other bodies and individuals supplying 
public services. 
x Article 11 ± the Commissioner¶V powers of investigation and settlement 
x Articles 16-18 ± granting only complainants under article 7 the right, if necessary, to 
SXUVXH WKHLU JULHYDQFHV LQ WKH &RXQW\ &RXUW XVLQJ WKH &RPPLVVLRQHU¶V UHSRUW DV D
ground of action. 
x Articles 19 ±WKH&RPPLVVLRQHU¶VUHSRUWLQJSRZHUV 
x Plus various other powers of the Commissioner on discovery and confidentiality. 
Only some of these provisions specifically describe the inter-relationship between them, but 
clearly all refer to the operation of the Commissioner scheme as a whole and thereby rely 
upon each other to a certain degree. But how they do so is open to disagreement. A key issue 
that drove the judgment was the inclusion in article 16 of the legal right for the complainant 
                                                 
40
 JR55, para. 22. 
41
 Carltona Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All E.R. 560, 564. 
42
 See also Girvan LJ in the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal [2014] NICA 11. 
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to bring a claim for financial remedies in the County Court following an article 7 
investigation if he has not gained satisfaction through the Commissioner. At the risk of over-
simplifying the ruling, the conclusion arrived at was that this residuary legal right impacted 
on how both articles 8 and 11 should be interpreted. JR55 concerned an article 8 
investigation, not an article 7 investigation. Therefore, depending on how you interpret the 
judgment, either it was simply not available to the Commissioner to make a recommendation 
of financial remedies (because by inference these are only available to article 7 
investigations) or it was unreasonable for the Commissioner to make such recommendations 
(because the investigated GP could not later defend himself in the County Court).43         
Either way, the judgment relies upon making a connection between the various articles of the 
Order which was not specified in the Order itself. This lack of specificity means that there is 
DWOHDVWRQHRWKHULQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH2UGHU7KH2UGHU¶VSURYLVLRQPLJKWEHUHDGDVGHDOLQJ
with two completely separate processes. In the first process, article 7 and 8 investigations are 
dealt with by the Commissioner through the powers of article 11, by way of investigation 
and, if necessary, an attempted settlement. At this stage there is no restriction on the remedy 
that can be recommended by the Commissioner, but nor is there a compulsion on the 
investigated party to comply. In the second process, which only applies to article 7 
investigations, if the individual complainant is dissatisfied with the outcome of the complaint 
to the Commissioner he/she can then apply to the County Court, which then separately makes 
an order for a financial remedy.  
To resolve such an LQWHUSUHWLYHGLOHPPD(NLQVKDVDUJXHGWKDWµLQWHUSUHWHUVVKRXOGUHDGWKH
statutory text asking what the presumptively rational and reasonable legislature that enacted it 
inWHQGHG WR FRQYH\ E\ HQDFWLQJ LW¶.44 However, with an example such as the above, the 
reasons for the choice of construction adopted might reduce the options available but it 
remains unclear which is the rational best choice.45 Therefore, unless contextual factors are 
explored, the choice must EHEDVHGRQVRPHWKLQJHOVHVXFKDVWKHMXGJH¶VLQWXLWLRQ, bias or 
claim to authority.46  
A focus on textual interpretation risks blinding the judge to wider ramifications 
Textual interpretation is in part justified because of its claimed narrow focus. In practice 
though, often general points of law exist that will not just be relevant to the legislation at 
hand, but will be repeated across a whole range of statutory situations. One such issue that 
was raised in JR55 is the legal status of a private provider of public services. The judgment 
found that a GP µLVQRWDSXEOLFERG\EXWPHUHO\SURYLGHVVHUYLFHVWRDSXEOLFERG\XQGHUD
FRQWUDFWRUVRPHRWKHUFRQVHQVXDODUUDQJHPHQW¶47  
The finding on the legal status of GPs was not a necessary one according to the wording of 
the Order, which was silent on the issue. Article 8 merely allowed the investigation of 
complaints against a range of health service providers, other than those public bodies 
specifically listed in schedule 2 of the Order. If the point was important, the Court could have 
adapted existing case law but here the answer is unclear and deserved further analysis.48 As it 
                                                 
43
 Contrary to the Supreme Court, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal also ruled that it was unlawful for the 
Commissioner to recommend a financial remedy in any investigations, [2014] NICA 11, at [33]. 
44
 R. EkinV³7KH,QWHQWLRQRI3DUOLDPHQW´ [2010] PL 709, 726.  
45
 ')HOGPDQ³Statutory interpretation and constitutional legislation´ [2014] 130 LQR 473, 479. 
46
 R. Cahill-2¶&DOODJKDQ ³The Influence of PerVRQDO9DOXHVRQ/HJDO -XGJPHQWV´ (2013) 40 Journal of Law 
and Society 59653RVQHU³:KDWLVZURQJZLWKWKH)HGHUDO-XGJH\HWHPLQHQWO\FXUDEOH3DUW,,´ (2016) 19 
Green Bag 257. 
47
 JR55, at [20].   
48
 Eg YL v Birmingham CC [2007] UKHL 27 
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stands though, even if we treat the finding only as obiter and easily distinguishable in future 
cases, the rather perfunctory treatment given to such an important point of law looks like an 
attempt to smuggle into the judgment a view as to the law which can only be based on certain 
undisclosed preconceptions as to what the law should be.49  
The creation of uncertainty 
An argument in favour of textual interpretation might be that it minimises the impact of 
judicial decision-making to the statutory scheme concerned but this will sometimes be a 
naïve assumption, with cases on the ombudsman sector an example. In JR55, the judgment 
failed to isolate the law being interpreted to the Commissioner for Complaints scheme alone. 
Nor could it given the myriad of overlaps in legislative terminology and themes in the case 
which were relevant to other ombudsman schemes designed with much the same powers. 
These similarities included: the subject matter, which was the investigation of GPs; the 
selection and definition of complaints for investigation; the nature of the remedies that can be 
recommended; and the means of enforcement pursued.50  
7KH &RXUW¶V UXOLQJ WKDW LW ZDV XQODZIXO IRU WKH &RPPLVVLRQer to recommend a financial 
remedy in this case is the starkest example of its knock-on impact. Confusingly, at two points 
the judgment refers approvingly to the power of ombudsman schemes, including the 
Commissioner, to make financial recommendations agaiQVW ERGLHV SD\LQJ µRXW RI SXEOLF
IXQGV¶51 But, as outlined above, WKH &RXUW¶V IOXLG DSSURDFK WR WKH WDVN RI VWDWXWRU\
interpretation led it to quash a recommendation for financial compensation. 
A further uncertainty sowed by JR55 relates to the circumstances when a complaint can be 
accepted. Article 9 of the 1996 Order is very similar to equivalent provisions in other 
ombudsman schemes and states that: 
>7@KH&RPPLVVLRQHUVKDOOQRWFRQGXFWDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQ«LQUHVSHFWRIDQ\DFWLRQLQUHVSHFW
of which the person aggrieved has or had a remedy by way of proceedings in a court of law. 
The Commissioner may conduct an investigation notwithstanding that the person aggrieved 
KDVDULJKWRUUHPHG\«LIWKH&RPPLVVLRQHULVVDWLVILHGWKDWLQWKHSDUWLFXODUFLUFXPVWDQFe it 
is not reasonable to expect him or her to resort or to have resorted to it.  
This provision allows an ombudsman scheme to accept a complaint for investigation, 
notwithstanding the potential for the complainant to access an alternative remedy such as a 
judicial remedy. Here is a discretionary power the meaning of which the courts have 
disagreed on in two Court of Appeal cases Croydon52 and Liverpool.53 Both these cases 
involved the Local Government Ombudsman, not the Commissioner for Complaints, but the 
almost precise copy of the wording in the separate items of legislation make the case law 
highly relevant. In Croydon, it was found that the provision established a presumption in 
favour of judicial redress. By contrast, in the later case of Liverpool the Court ruled that the 
decision to accept a complaint was a discretionary decision challengeable only on 
Wednesbury unreasonable grounds.54  
                                                 
49
 Remarkably, and unnecessarily, in an obiter statement the Court also found that another scheme, the 
3DUOLDPHQWDU\&RPPLVVLRQHUIRU$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ3&$µKDVQRSRZHUWR investigate complaints against private 
LQGLYLGXDOVSURYLGLQJVHUYLFHVWRJRYHUQPHQWGHSDUWPHQWVRUSXEOLFERGLHV¶ JR55, para. 26. 
50
 For instance, the Health Services Ombudsman, the Scottish Pubic Services Ombudsman and the Public 
Services Ombudsman for Wales all have jurisdiction over health. 
51
 JR55, [24]. See also [22]. 
52
 Croydon LBC [1989] 1 All E.R. 1033. 
53
 R (Liverpool City Council) v Commissioner for Local Administration [2000] EWCA Civ 54 
54
 Liverpool, at [41], per Chadwick LJ. 
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The ruling in JR55 did not address this legal history but instead, citing only Croydon, implied 
WKDW DUWLFOH  QRW RQO\ LPSDFWHG RQ WKH &RPPLVVLRQHU¶V GLVFUHWLRQDU\ SRZHU WR DFFHSW D
complaint for investigation but also necessarily went to the nature of the remedy that could 
later be recommended. The degree to which an ombudsman is required to limit the scope of 
an investigation according to the facts of the case, as known at the time of the original 
complaint, is a point of law that has also received judicial attention, and again is relevant to 
other schemes than the Commissioner. The case of Cavanagh55 suggests that there are limits 
in the extent to which an investigation can be extended beyond the original complaint, 
whereas Miller56 treats this as a discretionary decision best dealt with through the rationality 
test. In Miller it was accepted that it will often be unrealistic for a complainant to be capable 
of capturing the full nature of the grievance because they will not be aware of all the facts. 
Thus there will be occasions when, following preliminary investigation, it might be 
appropriate for an ombudsman scheme to expand its inquiry in order to interrogate matters 
likely to have caused the grievance but which were not originally identified in the complaint.     
Once more the Supreme Court did not consider the previous case law and inferred from the 
facts that the complainant in JR55 KDG FRPSODLQHG µORRNLQJ IRU H[SODQDWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQ
PRQH\¶57 This is an unusual way to describe the receipt of a complaint by an ombudsman. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the reasoning in Miller, given the original complaint the Court ruled 
WKDW LW ZDV µ>LP@SURSHU IRU >WKH &RPPLVVLRQHU@ WR UHFRPPHQG D SD\PHQW RI PRQH\ DQG
WKUHDWHQWRUHSRUWRQWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VIDLOXUHWRSD\LW¶58   
Given that very similar legal questions can be asked of other ombudsman schemes, the 
implications of the ruling in JR55 might extend beyond the now closed Commissioner for 
Complaints scheme. Indeed, contained in JR55 is a powerful train of thought that challenges 
the lawfulness of the recommendation of financial remedies by all schemes, with the most 
vulnerable comparable scenario those other ombudsman schemes that investigate GPs. This 
ruling goes against current practice in more than one ombudsman scheme,59 not all of which 
include an expressly worded statutory provision authorising the recommendation of financial 
settlements. It quite possibly follows from JR55 that either ombudsman schemes should 
avoid altogether recommending financial recommendations or, in the alternative, that because 
financial remedies might be obtainable through other legal channels, complainants that 
indicate any interest in the pursuit of a financial remedy should be encouraged to go to court 
rather than the ombudsman.  
 
E. Contextual interpretation  
If literal interpretations are to be rejected, other solutions than textual strategies are available 
to interpret legislation.60 In this regard, contextual interpretation strategies might be argued to 
be preferable in replacing µXQVXEVWDQWLDWHGUHIHUHQFHVWRWKHLQWHQWLRQRI3DUOLDPHQW¶ZLWKµa 
more open and systematic consideration of any legislative purpose, and of any relevant 
principles (and policies)¶.61 However, because contextual interpretation strategies call for the 
judge to consider the purposes of legislation, they create considerable space for the judiciary 
                                                 
55
 Cavanagh v Health Service Commissioner [2005] EWCA Civ 1578. 
56
 Miller v Health Service Commissioner [2015] EWHC 2981, at [59]. 
57
 JR55, at [17]. 
58
 JR55, at [17]. 
59
 Eg Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, Report by the health service ombudsman for England of 
an investigation into a complaint made by Mr and Mrs M. HC. 132 (2013±14), pp. 84±86. 
60
 (J:(VNULGJHµDynamic Statutory Interpretation¶. 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). 
61
 $$VKZRUWK³,QWHUSUHWLQJ&ULPLQDO6WDWXWHVD &ULVLVRI/HJDOLW\´>@L.Q.R. 419. 
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in their interpretation of legislation. The question thereby arises as to how such judicial 
power can be explained and justified without the judiciary overreaching its powers. Several 
techniques were available to the Court in JR55 to arrive at plausible contextual interpretations 
but only one was taken up.  
Compare the legislation with other similar legislative provisions 
If a legislative provision is ambiguous can assistance be derived from similar legislative 
provisions in other Acts? At one point, the judgment deploys this strategy in JR55. One of the 
legal questions that had to be resolved was whether or not the Commissioner possessed the 
power to issue a special report to the Assembly highlighting the refusal of the GP to pay the 
recommended compensation. This raised yet another point left unspecified in the legislation. 
Article 19 stated that in DGGLWLRQ WRDQQXDO UHSRUWV WKH&RPPLVVLRQHUFRXOG OD\ µsuch other 
UHSRUWV EHIRUH WKH $VVHPEO\ DV KH WKLQNV ILW¶. An interpretation of this provision is that it 
could be implicitly meant WR DOORZ UHSRUWV VXFKDV WKHRQHSURSRVHG WRKLJKOLJKW WKH*3¶V
non-implementation of a recommendation. The Supreme Court, however, chose this point to 
expand its compass beyond the textual approach otherwise deployed in the judgment. In order 
to gain an LQVLJKWLQWRWKHEHVWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIµUHSRUWFODXVHV¶the judgment referenced two 
equivalent schemes, the Parliamentary Ombudsman62 and the Northern Ireland Assembly 
Ombudsman.63 Both schemes allow specifically for special reports to be submitted to the 
legislature on occasions where non-compliance occurred. Therefore, the inference was made 
in JR55 that drafting practice tended towards the specification of the power to issue a special 
report, leading to the conclusion that where such a power was not specifically referred to, as 
with the Commissioner, then such a power could not be exercised.  
The conclusion drawn here is not an essential inference. Just because two other statutory 
schemes operate this way does not require the broad discretionary power of another statutory 
scheme to be restrictively constructed. But in this instance at least the explanation provides a 
transparent, easily comprehensible and above all defensible DFFRXQWRI3DUOLDPHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQ. 
Differences in interpretation can be resolved through appeal to rule of law norms 
To aid interpretation, the courts sometimes use legal norms to establish the expectations of 
the rule of law.64 As noted above, a crucial question in JR55 was whether within the 
Commissioner¶V JHQHUDO SRZHU WR HIIHFW D VHWWOHPHQW LW ZDV ODZIXO IRU WKH RIILFH to 
recommend financial compensation. To resolve the matter, the judgment of Girvan LJ in the 
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal (NICA) contained just such an appeal to a legal norm. He 
found that: 
«Lt would require clear wording to infer that the Commissioner has a power to make a recommendation 
that a body or individual pay monies in consequence of a finding of maladministration. Such a power 
would have to be found in express wording or by necessary implication from the relevant legislation.65  
Thus for the NICA, because the power to recommend financial compensation had not been 
explicitly granted to the Commissioner by law, WKH &RPPLVVLRQHU¶V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQ of 
financial compensations contravened the legal norm.  
This proposed legal norm did have the merit of providing a strong underpinning ground with 
which to establish coherence to textual efforts to interpret the 1996 Order in the round. The 
difficulty with the legal rule proposed by Girvan LJ, however, is that no authority or 
justificatory analysis was provided to support the norm. The wording deployed did mirror 
                                                 
62
 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, s.10(3). 
63
 The Parliamentary Commissioner (Northern Ireland) Act 1969, s.10(3).  
64
 /RUG,UYLQH³Activism and Restraint: Human Rights DQGWKH,QWHUSUHWDWLYH3URFHVV´ (1999) 10 K.C.L.J. 177. 
65
 JR55 (NICA), at [31]. 
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very closely a line adopted in several cases on civil liberties,66 but to transfer this line of 
reasoning across to the work of ombudsman schemes would represent a significant 
expansion. In JR55 there was no means by which the recommendations of the Commissioner 
could be enforced in law and the matter at stake was the payment of a non-career threatening 
sum of money.  
Notably the Supreme Court did not follow the NICA in applying this legal norm to support its 
judgment. Indeed, this example illustrates that as a judicial strategy, the use of legal norms to 
resolve a matter of statutory interpretation should be treated cautiously and only if supported 
by detailed exposition of the reasons in favour of their application.  
Consider the purpose behind the legislation and the context in which it operates   
7KH PDMRU DEVHQFH IURP WKH &RXUW¶V WRRONLW LQ JR55 was any apparent endeavour to 
contextualise either the reasons that laid behind the passage of the 1996 Order or the manner 
in which the scheme evolved or later operated. It is surmised here that this absence was not 
an accident, but was due to a belief that to do so would open the Court to the critique that it 
was allowing value judgments to creep into its decision-making or distract it from arriving at 
the most rational interpretation of the Order.  
  
                                                 
66
 Eg R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Pierson [1998] AC 539, at p. 575 per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson; R v Home Secretary ex p. Simms [2000] 2 AC 115. 
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If the Court had chosen to consider contextual factors, other questions and sources of 
LQIRUPDWLRQFRXOGKDYHEHHQXVHGWRDLGWKH&RXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH2UGHU)RULQVWDQFH
what such an inquiry would have revealed is that the 1996 Order derived from the 
Commissioner for Complaints Act (Northern Ireland) 1969. In drafting this legislation, the 
extraordinary sectarian problems in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, in particular for 
employment relations in local government, led to the inclusion of the original version of the 
article 16 provision67 which almost uniquely in the sector entitled complainants to use an 
RPEXGVPDQ¶Vreport as a cause of a legal action.68 Without this added power, it was felt that 
the Commissioner scheme would sometimes struggle to persuade local authorities to comply 
with its recommendations. By contrast, the jurisdiction to investigate health service 
complaints (later replicated in article 8) was added at a much later date, by which time the 
need to provide extra support to the commissioner scheme by creating a right of access to the 
court was less pressing. Indeed, the article 16 process had gone largely unused. Thus the 
expansion of the jurisdiction of the Commission under article 8 essentially mirrored 
equivalent legislative provisions from other UK schemes, as did the wording of the Order. 
With these same powers, other ombudsman schemes in the UK responsible for investigating 
health services have made financial recommendations.69 
In this context, it is difficult to read too much into the exclusion of article 8 investigations 
from the province of article 16. Had the Supreme Court taken account of these contextual 
factors, then it would have been much more difficult for it to justify construing the Order as 
implying that financial recommendations were excluded. At the very least, a positive benefit 
of integrating a contextual analysis into the judgment might have been that it would have 
required the Court to provide a much more robust defence of its decision than a solely textual 
strategy allowed for. A further outcome is that it could have assisted the Court in making a 
decision as to whether it was appropriate for it to move beyond the most obvious literal 
interpretation of the Order where the evidence of clear intent on the part of the legislature was 
so thin. In this instance, therefore, whatever the outcome on the facts, both judicial certainty 
and transparency would have been enhanced by a consideration of contextual factors.    
 
F. Using public law grounds to demonstrate judicial restraint  
It is not being argued here that it is never appropriate to interrogate the scope of discretionary 
power to ensure that its potential limits have been properly identified or that its underlying 
purposes have been fulfilled.70 However, there must be a limit to the viability of this 
enterprise. In its attempt to interpret legislation, the ruling in JR55 depended upon reasons 
which were never addressed or fully explained and which upon deeper analysis could not 
have been coherently explained without a full exposition of the policy choices being made. 
This lack of openness in judicial decision-making lends itself to the critique of judicial 
overreach, which cannot be rescued by an appeal to Parliamentary intention if no evidence is 
provided of that intention.  
To reduce the potential for such a controversial outcome, a better approach is for the courts to 
pre-empt an attempt to engage in statutory interpretation with an assessment of the 
appropriateness of the exercise. This stage in judicial reasoning should include a 
consideration of the available detail in the legislation, the context in which the legislation was 
                                                 
67
 Originally, s.7(2). 
68
 %7KRPSVRQ³7KHFRXUW¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWRRPEXGVPHQ± VXSHUYLVRUDQGSDUWQHU"´>@-6:)/ 
69
 Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, Report by the health service ombudsman for England of an 
investigation into a complaint made by Mr and Mrs M. HC. 132 (2013±14), pp. 84±86. 
70
 R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 AC 687 at [8], per Lord Bingham. 
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introduced and has evolved, and the duty of the court to exercise constitutional restraint. If 
following such an assessment the justification for moving beyond a literal interpretation is 
slim, then other strategies of judicial control should be pursued.  
One ruling in JR55 illustrates just such an alternative strategy available to the court to uphold 
rule of law values, which could have driven the decision. A number of generalisable public 
law grounds, such as procedural fairness, could have been used in JR55 to interrogate the 
discretionary decision made. In the event, the Court only considered the rationality test, 
finding WKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQHU¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQRINKDGEHHQµSOXFNHGRXWRIWKHDLU¶
DQGZDVµODFNLQJDQ\UDWLRQDOEDVLV¶71 Whilst this finding makes uncomfortable reading for 
WKHIRUPHU&RPPLVVLRQHU¶VRffice, this is the one aspect of the case that does not represent a 
significant departure from existing case law. The rationality finding in JR55 is founded on the 
requirement for an ombudsman scheme to base its decisions on reasoning which links its 
findings and recommendations closely to the alleged administrative failure,72 and for the 
derivation of financial compensatory recommendations to be clearly articulated.73  
The rationality test normally receives a mixed reception in legal circles, primarily because it 
can be portrayed as one of the most interventionist grounds that a court can apply, involving 
as it does a judgment-call on the substantive merits of a decision of a primary decision-
maker. But in the context of managing the institutional relationship between the ombudsman 
sector and the court, the rationality test rescues the court from having to indulge in creative 
interpretation of an ill-defined statute. In JR55, once it had been established that the Order 
did not directly address the matter at hand, this raised a fundamental question as to what was 
the most appropriate judicial strategy for dealing with the discretionary power. Rather than 
attempting to interpret an item of legislation that was never designed to be so interpreted, the 
Court could have acknowledged the very clear discretion given to the Commissioner by the 
legislature and focused instead on the rationality of the decisions that resulted. This is a 
review function that the legislature would have been able to anticipate when the Order was 
passed.  
With wide discretionary powers, tKH UDWLRQDOLW\ WHVW SURYLGHV D µVDIHW\ YDOYH¶ IXQFWLRQ
through which the court can (a) redress any demonstrable instances of ombudsman overreach; 
(b) send out a reminder to the ombudsman sector that robust and appropriate decision-making 
is a key feature of the rule of law; and (c) articulate with some specificity some of the forms 
of substantive decisions and processes that the Court is uncomfortable with. This latter point 
interlinks with a broader benefit of developing legal doctrine in an incremental fashion to 
GHILQH WKH OLPLWV RI DQ RPEXGVPDQ¶V GLVFUHWLRQ $ORQJ MXVW WKHVH OLQHV WKH Office of the 
Higher Independent Adjudicator (OIA) has laid out ten lessons that can be derived from the 
VFKHPH¶VFDVe law, most of which are only indirectly attributable to an interpretation of the 
relevant legislation and owe more to the experience of fine-tuning general principles of 
public law specifically to the ombudsman sector.74     
Reliance upon public law doctrine does not remove the risk of judicial overreach but the most 
important reason in favour of legal doctrine over expansive textual interpretation is that it is 
the most transparent option. In public law judges are always required to make choices in 
areas where policy considerations are in play, JR55 demonstrates this very well. Judicial 
VWUDWHJLHVPD\EHDYDLODEOHWRUHGXFHWKHMXGJH¶VFDSDFLW\WRDOORZXQGHUO\LQJELDVHVWRGULYH
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 JR55, at [30]. 
72
 Atwood v The Health Service Commissioner [2008] EWHC 2315, at [29]-[31]. 
73
 Cardao-Pito, R (on the application of) v Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education & Anor  
[2012] EWHC 203 (Admin). 
74
 Mitchell, The OIA and Judicial Review. 
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their decision-making but an overriding demand on the judiciary is that they should be clear 
and open about the reasoning that they employ. The overall impression from reading the 
judgment in JR55 is that the Court viewed with great reservation the imposition of a financial 
penalty on a private practitioner (notwithstanding that the penalty was only a 
recommendation) through an ombudsman scheme that had only been implicitly given that 
power. One might also speculate that the Court viewed with suspicion the capacity of an 
ombudsman scheme to provide the requisite level of procedural fairness that such a penalty 
deserves. Both these sets of findings could have been expressed very clearly as demonstrating 
the ground of irrationality and if expressed as such would have sent out a much clearer and 
more respectful message as to the expectations of the law in the future than the judgment we 
received.     
 
G. Conclusion  
Judicial decision-making is not a science and there are a range of soft variables that can 
LQWHUYHQHWRDIIHFWDFDVH¶VRXWFRPHVXFKDVWKHEDUULVWHU¶VSHUIRUPDQFHDQGWKHEDFNJURXQG
pressures on the court. With JR55, at a late point in the process one judge had to recuse 
himself75 and the hearing itself was hastily curtailed despite many of the legal issues raised in 
this article having not been interrogated. Given this context, it might be tempting to conclude 
that the shortcomings in the JR55 ruling simply reflect a bad day at the office.  
There are two reasons for not being so sanguine about JR55. First, the history of the case law 
on the ombudsman suggests that it will probably be a long time before another case will be 
heard in the Supreme Court to clarify the points of law left confused by the ruling. Even 
WKRXJKWKHMXGJPHQWUHIHUUHGWRWKHFDVHDVµPRRW¶because it involved a closing ombudsman 
scheme,76 this article has shown that the shadow cast by the judgment may be lengthy 
because of the transferable points of law it tackled. By deploying an inappropriate judicial 
strategy there is much about the ruling that could create a chilling effect on the sector and a 
recurrent need to distinguish JR55 in future case law.  
Second, it is entirely possible that far from the judgment in JR55 being a bad decision, in the 
sense of being rushed and inattentive to case law, it was a deliberate exercise in judicial 
strategy designed to send out a message as to how public law cases should be resolved. It is 
the efficacy of this second possibility that this article has deconstructed given that its 
implications might go wider than the ombudsman sector. However, the body of case law on 
the ombudsman sector illustrates that there already exists the foundation of a preferable 
model for reviewing discretionary power. It is probable that the appropriate judicial strategy 
towards discretionary power depends very much on the context. But the model outlined here, 
whereby rigorous statutory interpretation is only attempted once the court has provided clear 
reasons to justify this approach, might provide an institutional strategy which could be 
applied more generally to the judicial task of reviewing administrative discretion.77  
Richard Kirkham 
Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Sheffield 
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 JR55, at [5]. 
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